U.S. Presidents Love Powerful Pakistani Military Men
The U.S. has always had a special interest in Pakistan’s military dictators, from Ayub Khan and Zia-ul-Haq to Pervez Musharraf and now Asim Munir. According to *TIME* magazine, the reason for this affection is simple: U.S. leaders see these military strongmen as effective tools for advancing their strategic agendas, both covert and overt.
Kokcha News Agency – In a recent article published by *TIME* magazine, Pakistani author Mohammed Hanif explores the longstanding relationship between the U.S. and Pakistan’s military leaders. The article highlights how, since 1959, Pakistan has been led by military generals who seized power through coups and were legitimized by their close ties with U.S. presidents.
The article recalls how Ayub Khan, Pakistan’s first military dictator, rose to power in 1959 and became a close ally of U.S. President Lyndon B. Johnson. Historical photos show Ayub Khan affectionately patting Johnson’s cheek, and Johnson engaging in friendly conversations with a cart driver in the streets of Karachi. Ayub Khan, however, was skeptical about the nature of this relationship and wrote a book titled *”Friends Not Masters,”* inspired by a poem by Allama Iqbal, which suggested that the food America provides would not hinder Pakistan’s lofty ambitions. In reality, Pakistan, an agrarian country with fertile lands, needed political support from Washington to suppress internal dissent and maintain its military dominance.
Fast forward to today, Pakistan has its second Field Marshal, Asim Munir, who was promoted after a brief conflict with India. Unlike his predecessors, Munir was invited to the White House without having staged a coup. Former U.S. President Donald Trump considered meeting him an honor, and Pakistan even nominated Trump for the Nobel Peace Prize.
The article notes that while Pakistan has all the trappings of democracy—a parliament, a prime minister, a judiciary, and a vocal media—the military remains the ultimate decision-maker, especially after the imprisonment of former Prime Minister Imran Khan. This is why the U.S. has always interacted more with the military than with civilian leaders.
Historically, even dictators like Zia-ul-Haq and Pervez Musharraf enjoyed U.S. support when they served American interests. Zia-ul-Haq aided the U.S. during the Cold War by providing bases to monitor Soviet activities, while Musharraf fully cooperated with the U.S. after 9/11, offering Pakistani airbases and handing over Taliban commanders, including the group’s ambassador, to the U.S.
The author argues that the Pakistani military has kept the country in a state of suffocation. Generals can choose the ruling party, suppress opposition, control elections, and manipulate the judiciary. Yet, the military still has a solid “side job”: warfare. Its quick response during recent conflicts with India has surprised international analysts.
Despite this, the military’s popularity at home is at an all-time low. Even a simple “Assalamu Alaikum” message from the military’s public relations team on social media is met with a flood of insults. The public has lost faith in promises of discovering “vast oil reserves” and strategic partnerships with the U.S.
The article concludes with a warning: all it takes is a spark of sulfur to test the bond between Pakistan’s rulers and their masters in Washington. A political activist is quoted as saying, “If you don’t accept our demands, we’ll set this sulfur on the American flag, take a photo, and see what America really thinks of you.”
The author ends with a question: Friend? Master? Or the same old cunning ally who still has the ability to hunt?
