The Future of the Taliban and Regional Miscalculations

Kokcha News Agency – In a comprehensive interview, Amrullah Saleh, the former Acting President of Afghanistan and a long-time opponent of the Taliban, provides a sharp critique of the group’s evolution from their first rule in the 1990s to their current incarnation. Saleh argues that the Taliban’s return to power in 2021 was not a military victory but a calculated political alignment, turning them into an unwanted “asset” for global powers.

Taliban 1.0 vs. Taliban 2.0: From Militia to “Assets”

Saleh emphasizes that the Taliban of today, often referred to as Taliban 2.0, are not a repeat of their 1990s predecessors. Instead, they are a transformed force shaped by geopolitics and external support. He recalls, “In the 1990s, we in the resistance had better relations with China.” Back then, China’s primary concern was the presence of Uyghur fighters allied with the Taliban. However, today, while the East Turkestan Islamic Movement remains a concern for Beijing, it has lost its central importance.

What defines Taliban 2.0, according to Saleh, is the geopolitical framework of the 2020 Doha Agreement. He argues that the Taliban are “executing the agreement clause by clause to serve the geopolitical interests of the U.S.” Under the agreement, only al-Qaeda was recognized as a terrorist organization, while other groups were effectively left under Taliban protection. Simultaneously, Washington provides $60 million weekly for humanitarian and civilian needs, which Saleh claims is funneled through Taliban-controlled charities, directly supporting their power structure.

“The U.S./NATO did not lose; they turned the Taliban into their asset,” Saleh asserts. This, he believes, has forced China to reconsider its stance. Initially “happy and delighted” by the West’s withdrawal, Beijing compared Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhundzada to Mao Zedong. However, as Saleh wryly notes, “They have now realized their naivety.”

Terrorist Ties: Al-Qaeda, ISIS-K, and Others

Despite the guarantees of the Doha Agreement, the Taliban remain entangled with transnational extremist groups. Saleh bluntly states, “The Taliban are seriously helping the U.S. in pacifying al-Qaeda. This is a multi-faceted program that the Taliban are committed to.”

He argues that the killing of Ayman al-Zawahiri in Kabul in 2022 was not solely an American operation but was made possible with the cooperation of a faction within the Taliban. However, this cooperation is selective. While some Taliban factions seeking international engagement may assist in weakening al-Qaeda, they have no commitment to combating other groups. “The Taliban have no obligation to confront groups other than al-Qaeda. They are not committed to any document,” Saleh explains.

This has created an environment where groups like ISIS-Khorasan, the Pakistani Taliban, the Haqqani Network, and Uyghur fighters continue to find refuge. Saleh believes this stems from a “secret and strategic agreement” to use radical Islam as a tool of foreign policy.

China’s Cautious Gamble

No regional actor embodies the contradictions of engaging with the Taliban more than China. During the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Beijing maintained economic and diplomatic ties while simultaneously building connections with the government’s enemies. Saleh describes this approach as a “negative example.”

Since the Taliban’s return, China’s engagement has been cautious. Beijing funds certain Taliban factions but has no real project for the Afghan people. A prime example is the stalled Aynak copper mine project. Saleh notes, “China is not a risk-taking country. It is overly cautious. Therefore, its influence should not be exaggerated.”

He points out that China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) has a presence in Kabul and provinces like Badakhshan, providing equipment and training, and even had a mission in Bagram. However, China’s involvement pales in comparison to the CIA’s support for the Taliban. “Yes, they pay some Taliban factions to buy influence, but they cannot become a strategic patron,” Saleh says.

Regarding those who compare Akhundzada to Mao, Saleh retorts, “Haibatullah is not Mao; he is more like Pol Pot.”

The Future of the Taliban and Regional Miscalculations

Saleh believes the biggest regional miscalculation is the assumption that Taliban rule will endure. He insists that the Taliban “have no popular legitimacy” and “are terrified of public participation.” Their reliance on U.S. cash highlights this fragility. “Without weekly aid and CIA support, they will be forced to rely solely on internal resources, which cannot sustain their regime. It will collapse,” Saleh predicts.

Meanwhile, the human cost of Taliban rule is staggering. “Millions have fled the country due to their racist and repressive policies,” he recalls. The multi-ethnic character of Afghanistan, which existed under the previous republic, “has been destroyed by the Taliban.” The current regime is not based on legitimacy but on fear, patronage networks, and foreign money.

Saleh’s message to China and other powers is clear: “Countries should avoid investing in an anti-people group that is terrified of seeking legitimacy from the people.” He emphasizes that only a people-centered solution can bring lasting stability.

Conclusion: Beyond Short-Term Calculations

Saleh’s warnings run counter to the prevailing realist policies that have shaped the world’s approach to the Taliban since 2021. In his view, by bolstering an anti-people and factional regime, global powers have traded short-term tactical gains for long-term instability. China, in particular, risks being trapped in a fragile order it cannot shape or stabilize.

“Afghanistan is neither Talibanistan nor Pashtunistan,” Saleh asserts. The country’s multi-ethnic character is indelible, and those who align with a “tribal and terrorist” system will ultimately fail.

While the Taliban hold Kabul today, Saleh’s message is clear: Without legitimacy, popular support, and stable governance, their rule is temporary. For regional and global powers, the real choice is not whether to engage with the Taliban, but whether to bet on a regime destined to collapse.


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